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THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND OTHER STATUTES
RELATING TO GOVERNMENT LIABILITY: EXEMPLIFI-
CATION BY GOVERNMENT AIRCRAFT
INCIDENTS
By WILLIAM L. OTTEN, JR.*
The years since World War I have witnessed a tremendous growth in
the operation and use of aircraft. Although the airplane was originally con-
sidered a dangerous instrumentality, thereby imposing absolute liability upon
its owner and operator,' the advent of improved safety measures is causing a
gradual retreat from this strict position.2 In some jurisdictions the common
law rule of absolute liability has been abrogated to the extent that a statutory
presumption of negligence may be rebutted and liability avoided by proving
an absence of negligence.
3
In any event, it can be said that in American jurisdictions, injury and
damage caused by the negligent operation of aircraft give rise to liability
where private parties are involved.4 The question then posed is: What par-
ticular problems arise where the aircraft is operated by or on behalf of the
United States? Despite improved safety records, the headlines are still
replete with reports of airplane crashes involving government aircraft. Air-
craft accidents occur in foreign countries, in the United States, and on the
high seas. They involve military personnel, civilians, government workers,
and foreign citizens. They damage personal property as well as real property,
cause death as well as personal injury. As a result of the variety of factual
situations that have occurred, a maze of law has evolved in which the rights
of parties vary considerably, depending upon the status of the claimant, the
location of the mishap, and the conditions under which the government air-
craft was being operated. A clarification of those rules pertaining to the
United States is the purpose of this article.
Any analysis of government liability must begin with a consideration of
the problem of sovereign immunity, for it is well settled that except insofar
as it may consent, the sovereign is immune from suit in any court" by its
citizens, 6 its political subdivisions, or foreign states and nationals. Thus the
* Capt., U.S.A.F.; A.B., Penn State University; LL.B., Dickinson School of Law;
Member of the Pennsylvania Bar. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are
those of the individual and do not represent the view of either the Judge Advocate
General, U.S. Air Force, or any other governmental agency. Reference to this article
should include the foregoing statement.
1. PROSSER, TORTS 454 (1941) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 519-520 (1939).
2. 6 AM. JUR. Aviation § 60 (1950).
3. D'Anna v. United States, 181 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1950).
4. 6 AM. JUR. Aviation § 60 (1950).
5. 54 AM. JUR. United States § 127 (1956).
6. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941).
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United States is liable for injury and damage caused by the operation of
aircraft, only to the extent that such liability is founded upon a consent statute
authorizing either an action against the United States or administrative
consideration of a claim properly presented.
At the present time there is no statute placing liability upon the United
States for damage or injury caused by combatant air operations in time of
war, and suit is therefore barred on the ground of sovereign immunity. The
destruction of, or injury to, private property in battle or in the bombardment
of cities and towns must be borne by the sufferers. 7 Hence, all the statutes
hereinafter discussed apply to cases arising from non-combat activities of the
armed forces. The lone exceptions are those administrative claims payable
to military personnel and civilian employees under the Military Personnel
Claims Act." The sole recourse of a private citizen in such cases is to petition
Congress for private legislation.9
The determination of what constitutes a claim arising out of combatant
activities in time of war depends largely upon the exercise of sound discretion
and resolves itself into a question of degree. For example, in 1945, naval
ships detailed as ammunition carriers had returned from the combat zone
prior to any termination of the status of war. Pending reassignment they
were temporarily berthed in a bay containing clam and oyster beds which
were damaged by a discharge of oil and sewage from the vessels. It was held
that the vessels were not engaged in combat activities and the damages in-
curred did not arise out of combat activities, even though it was wartime.
10
In this case the connection with combat activities was sufficiently remote for
the court to allow a suit against the United States. On the other hand, an
injured soldier who had just returned from the combat zone was negligently
treated in a hospital in the United States. He was held to have a claim
arising out of combat activities, and therefore was denied access to the courts.
11
There are other considerations involved where a member of the armed forces
is the claimant; nevertheless, the court in the above instance considered that
the cause of action had its inception in the combat zone, thus barring suit.
If these two cases are to be reconciled, it must be done on the basis of
the place of inception of the injury or damage. Where the injury initially
occurred in the combat zone, it was held to arise out of combatant activities.
Conversely, where the damage had its inception out of the combat zone, it
was held to arise out of non-combatant activities.
The next question to consider is whether there has been a waiver of im-
7. United States v. Pacific R. Co., 120 U.S. 227 (1887).
8. Military Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2732 (1958).
9. 45 STAT. 413 (1928), 31 U.S.C. § 236 (1958).
10. Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1948).
11. Perucki v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 959 (M.D. Pa. 1948).
[Vol. 65
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
munity with respect to flights of government aircraft in peacetime. Generally,
the answer to this question must be in the affirmative, in view of the statutory
waiver contained in the Federal Tort Claims Act, hereinafter referred to as
the Tort Claims Act.1 2 In addition to the Tort Claims Act, a quasi-liability
has been placed upon the United States by several acts requiring administra-
tive settlement of claims for damage or injury under specialized circumstances.
These are the Military Claims Act, 13 the Military Personnel Claims Act,
14
and the Foreign Claims Act.15 Also placing liability on the United States in
connection with government operated aircraft in foreign countries are the
provisions of the Status of Forces Agreements, of which the NATO Status
of Forces Agreement drawn in connection with the North Atlantic Treaty
Alliance is a typical example.16 The most important provision from the
standpoint of litigation is obviously the Tort Claims Act, which accordingly
is the subject of the following discussion. Briefly, the Tort Claims Act
subjects the United States to liability for damages, loss, and personal injury
or death caused by the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of its em-
ployees in the scope of their employment, if a private party in the same situa-
tion would be liable.
Since liability under the Tort Claims Act is founded upon acts or omis-
sions of government employees, the first problem to be considered is: Who
are employees of the United States? Obviously, civil service personnel and
military personnel employed at full-time occupations for the government are
employees of the United States. Conversely, National Guardsmen not called
into active federal service are not employees of the United States within
the meaning of the Tort Claims Act.17 However, where a member of the
National Guard is also employed as a civilian caretaker of United States
property assigned to the National Guard, he has been held to be an employee
of the United States.' 8 It would seem that the controlling tests in all cases
to determine whether an individual is an employee of the United States
are whether his employment is authorized by a federal statute, and whether
he is paid from funds appropriated by the federal government. 19
12. Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402,
2411, 2412, 2671-2680 (1958).
13. 10 U.S.C. § 2733 (1958).
14. 10 U.S.C. § 2732 (1958).
15. 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1958).
16. North Atlantic Treaty, Status of Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. & O.I.A.
1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846.
17. Dover v. United States, 192 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1951) ; McCranie v. United
States, 199 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Slagle v. United States, 228 F.2d 673, aff'd upon
rehearing, 243 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1957); United States v. Prager, 251 F.2d 266 (5th
Cir. 1958).
18. Elmo v. United States, 197 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1952) ; United States v. Duncan,
197 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1952).
19. See e.g., United States v. Wendt, 242 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1957).
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It is worthy of note that the statutory authorization for members of
the National Guard 20 is considerably different from that for members of the
reserve components of the armed services.21 Members of the National Guard
are officers of the state in which they serve, though federally recognized and
subject to federal call. Members of the reserve components are at all times
federal officers. A reserve on active duty is in a different position than a
National Guardsman, since the reserve must act, if he acts at all, under
orders from the United States and his compensation is paid from federal
funds. 22 The reservist, therefore, is squarely within the tests above mentioned
when on active duty, or activated for training.
The Civil Air Patrol has also been held not to be an instrumentality of
the United States, and its members cannot therefore place liability upon the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Thus a member of the
Civil Air Patrol flying an Air Force plane on loan from the Air Force was
held not to be an employee of the United States because of his membership
in the Civil Air Patrol.23 In arriving at its decision the court noted that the
Civil Air Patrol was incorporated as a voluntary civilian auxiliary of the
Air Force. The court concluded that although the Civil Air Patrol was not
chartered as an independent non-governmental entity, it was on the other
hand not a wholly owned government corporation of the type whose financial
transactions are kept under the close supervision of Congress. It receives
no greater supervision from Congress and occupies no different position than
any other private corporation granted a federal charter.
24
With respect to military personnel on active duty, it has been held that
an airman working full time as an employee of an Air Force Exchange oc-
cupied a dual position, in that he was a lent servant and also a regular service-
man. Thus he was an employee of the United States, but the test of liability
turned on the question of whether he was acting in the scope of employment.
It was held that in lawfully acting for the Exchange he was in the scope of
his employment. 25 There is considerable doubt as to whether an Exchange is
in fact an instrumentality of the United States, and the cases have held both
ways.
26
The law is also not clear as to the exact status of employees of an officers'
mess or officers' club. Although it would appear that the government may
sustain liability under the Tort Claims Act as the result of the operation of
20. 32 U.S.C. §§ 101-110, 301-333 (1958).
21. 10 U.S.C. §§ 3076, 3077, 8076, 8077 (1958).
22. 10 U.S.C. §§ 261-280 (1958).
23. Pearl v. United States, 230 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1956).
24. Hooten v. Civil Air Patrol, 161 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Wisc. 1958).
25. Roger v. Elrod, 125 F. Supp. 62 (D.C. Alaska 1954).
26. Daniels v. Chanute Air Force Base Exchange, 127 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. Ill.
1955) ; Pulaski Cab Co. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 955 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
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an officers' club or officers' mess, all employees of an officers' mess are not
employees of the United States.2 7 With respect to these and other non-
appropriated fund activities it would appear that if the activity, such as the
operation of the Exchange or Officers' Club, is for the benefit of the United
States and the Armed Services in particular, it can therefore render the
United States liable under the Tort Claims Act. However, the status of the
individual whose negligence is the cause of the claim must be closely analyzed,
for if he is a military man he would apparently be an employee of the United
States, and if a civilian employee the details of his employment must be looked
to in order to determine his precise status.
Since the provisions of the Tort Claims Act place liability on the United
States for the negligent acts or omissions of government employees, owner-
ship of the aircraft, in and of itself, is not a material factor in determining
liability.28 The important consideration is whether or not an employee of
the government was involved and if so, whether he was acting within the
scope of his employment.
2 9
In one case an Air Force crew flew 300 miles from its designated train-
ing area to the pilot's home town. There they made low passes in an Air
Force plane directly over the court house, where the plane exploded. Deny-
ing recovery to the injured plaintiffs, the court found that the pilot and crew
were not acting within the scope of their employment and consequently,
the United States was not responsible. Thus, ownership of the aircraft in
and of itself was insufficient to impose liability upon the United States.A0
So also, where a drunken cadet took off in an Air Force plane without the
knowledge or consent of the United States or its duly authorized officials, the
court found that the plane was not being operated in line of duty.3 1 Stating
that the operation of an airplane in this type situation is analogous to the
operation of an automobile under similar circumstances, the court said the
cases have consistently held that the owner of a car is not liable for damages
resulting from the negligent operation of an automobile without his knowledge
or consent. As indicated by these two examples, the cases can be divided into
two groups:
(1) those in which the employee was on his own business or otherwise had
no authority to use the aircraft in the first instance;
(2) those in which the employee was initially authorized to use the aircraft
27. Aubrey v. United States, 254 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
28. United States v. Taylor, 236 F.2d 649 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 352 U.S. 963,
motion to remand denied, 353 U.S. 956 (1957).
29. Curtis v. United States, 117 F. Supp. 912 (N.D.N.Y. 1953).
30. United States v. Taylor, 236 F.2d 649 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 352 U.S. 963,
motion to remand denied, 353 U.S. 956 (1957).
31. King v. United States, 178 F.2d 320 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 964
(1950). See also Hubsch v. United States, 174 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1949).
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on the business of the United States and diverted the aircraft from the
business of the United States to business of his own.
In both cases, the same rules of respondeat superior applicable to other situa-
tions are employed. 32 Where the relationship of master and servant does not
exist, the United States is not liable under the Tort Claims Act.3 3 Where
the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment, the United
States is likewise not liable.
34
The determination of the problem of whether an employee is acting within
the scope of his employment is complicated by the fact that the federal courts
often apply the local law of respondeat superior, thereby creating the pos-
sibility of arriving at different results with respect to identical factual situa-
tions. The Court of Appeals in the Fifth Circuit rejected the contention that
liability could be fastened on the government solely because a servant of the
United States negligently drove a vehicle of the United States.3' The Court
of Appeals of the Second Circuit has held that state law controls, and under
the law of New York the owner of a motor vehicle is presumed liable for
the negligent operation thereof until refuted by substantial evidence to the
contrary.3 6 In the Fourth Circuit, a Maryland statute making the owner of
an aircraft prima facie liable for injuries caused by its operation was held
applicable to the United States under the Tort Claims Act.3 7 Later, in the
Fourth Circuit, it was held that whether a serviceman is acting within the
scope of his employment involves a question of statutory construction as to
which the federal courts are not bound by local decisions, but may apply
their own standards. s It appears that there is, in addition to the law of
respondeat superior as applied in the several states, a federal common law
of respondeat superior applicable to cases under the Tort Claims Act.39
Any attempt to reconcile all of these cases is beyond the scope of this
article, if not impossible. However, it may be said that as a prerequisite to
suit under the Tort Claims Act, the employee of the United States must be
acting within the scope of his employment at the time the injury or damage
occurred, and in this connection the federal law applies. If he was acting
32. United States v. Taylor, supra note 30; King v. United States, supra note 31.
33. Noe v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Tenn. 1956).
34. United States v. Alexander, 234 F.2d 861 (4th Cir. 1956) ; King v. United
States, supra note 31; Williams v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Calif. S.D.),
aff'd, 215 F.2d 800 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 857, remanded, 141 F. Supp. 851
(N.D. Calif. S.D.), aff'd, 248 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1957) ; United States v. Lushbough 200
F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1952) ; McConville v. United States, 197 F.2d 680 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 877 (1952).
35. Hubsch v. United States, supra note 31.
36. Mandelbaum v. United States, 251 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1958).
37. D'Anna v. United States, 181 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1950).
38. United States v. Sharpe, 189 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1951).
39. United States v. Lushbough, supra note 34.
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in the scope of his employment, the United States is liable as a private
person and to this extent the local law is applicable to determine if a private
employer would be liable under the same circumstances. Under all of the
cases where the employee is using a government aircraft for his own purposes,
or in a manner unauthorized by regulations, he has been held to be acting
outside the scope of his employment. Minor violations of regulations would
probably not be sufficient to take the employee outside the scope of his em-
ployment if the basic use of the aircraft is authorized and is in furtherance
of the business of the United States. By way of dicta, the courts have said
that disobedience of orders alone would not relieve the government of lia-
bility. 40 The question of whether the government's business has been aban-
doned, or whether there has been merely a minor violation of regulations not
taking the employee outside the scope of his employment appears to be a
matter of degree, to be decided by sound discretion.
Many airplane crashes involving the government also involve military
personnel, and in this connection the Tort Claims Act defines the term
"acting within the scope of his office or employment" in the case of military
personnel, as meaning, "acting in line of duty. '41 The phrase "in line
of duty" has been well defined in military matters, and has come to have
certain accepted meanings and connotations, not all of which are consistent
with the theories and policies of the Tort Claims Act. Considering this
problem, it has been held that the attempt to wrench the phrase "acting
within the scope of his office or employment" out of context, and give it the
new and expanded meaning attributed to "in line of duty" when members
of the armed forces themselves are claimants results in two inconsistent
meanings within the act-one for military personnel and one for all other
governmental employees. This, of course, is unacceptable, and the phrase
"in line of duty" for purposes of the Tort Claims Act must be given the
same construction applicable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
42
Accordingly the phrases "in line of duty" and "within the scope of his office
or employment" are with respect to the Tort Claims Act used interchangeably
and have the same meaning.
It is customary in connection with the death or injury of military per-
sonnel, or other serious incident, for the military authorities to conduct an
investigation, and arrive at a determination as to whether the military per-
sonnel involved were acting in line of duty. It has been held, in accordance
40. United States v. Taylor, supra note 30.
41. 28 U.S.C. 2671 (1958).
42. United States v. Campbell, 172 F.2d 500 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 957
(1949). See also Hubsch v. United States, supra note 31; United States v. Taylor,
supra note 30; United States v. Sharpe, supra note 38.
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with recognized rules of evidence, that this determination by the military
service is inadmissible in suits under the Tort Claims Act.
43
It can be seen from the foregoing that a military aviator on leave or
otherwise off-duty, flying a private aircraft for his own purposes, would not
be acting within the scope of his employment. 4 4 There is a gray area, how-
ever, where military personnel are acting under orders enroute to report for
active duty, or, being on active duty, are under orders transferring them to
another station or base. There have been no such cases found by the writer
involving aircraft. With respect to soldiers travelling in private motor
vehicles in compliance with change of station orders, there are cases which
have been decided for and against the government.
45
Thus far the problems of ownership of aircraft by the United States, the
definition of an employee of the United States, and the scope of employment
of such employee have been discussed. Of equal importance is the problem
of defining eligible claimants under the Tort Claims Act.
The Supreme Court in Brooks v. United States46 held that a member
of the Armed Forces on leave may recover under the Tort Claims Act for
injuries received, since these are not in line of duty nor incident to his
military service. However, in another case the Supreme Court said that a
member of the armed forces not on leave cannot recover under the Tort
Claims Act for injuries received while on active duty, resulting from the
negligence of others in the armed forces.4 7 The basis for the holding in the
latter case was that the Tort Claims Act must be construed to fit into the
entire scheme of statutory remedies against the government so as to make a
workable whole. A serviceman receives adequate compensation for service
connected injuries, and does not fall within the scope or contemplation of
the Tort Claims Act. It might also be observed that from a practical stand-
point it would place an impossible burden upon the federal courts if all in-
jured servicemen were enabled to litigate their claims. There is no inequity
involved, since there already exist other statutory provisions which adequately
care for the injured serviceman. While on leave, however, as has already
been noted, the serviceman is not acting in line of duty, and is more or less
acting in his private capacity, on his own business. If injured in this capacity,
he is, under the authority of the Brooks case, entitled to maintain suit under
the Tort Claims Act. However, any other benefits he may receive are
deductible from the amount of the judgment recovered.
43. Hubsch v. United States, supra note 31.
44. United States v. Eleazer, 177 F.2d 914 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 903
(1950).
45. United States v. Sharpe, supra note 38; Chopin v. United States, 258 F.2d 465
(9th Cir. 1958) ; Hinson v. United States, 257 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1958).
46. 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
47. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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Although the line of demarcation between the status of soldiers on active
duty and soldiers on leave is fairly clear, there exists a gray area of soldiers
who are off duty, or temporarily away from their base on a pass or some other
authorized form of liberty, such as when they are billeted in their private
quarters off-base. In deciding cases in this area, property claims have also
been involved, and for proper evaluation the Military Personnel Claims Act
must be taken into account.48 This act provides for the recovery of claims by
military personnel and civilian employees of the military for loss of personal
property if the loss was incident to military service, and if the property was
reasonable, useful or proper under the circumstances. There is no require-
ment under this act that negligence by the United States be shown; however,
the claim will be denied under the specific provisions of the act if there has
been contributory negligence by the claimant. Further, the claim will be
denied if the loss occurred at unassigned quarters in the United States,
though this restriction does not apply to unassigned quarters overseas.
The regulations of the armed services under which such claims are
paid provide that payment under these provisions is pre-emptive, and pro-
hibits recovery under any other provision. 49 In this regard, the courts have
held that recovery under the Military Personnel Claims Act for damage to
personal property, incident to service, is the exclusive remedy. 0 This is
true even where the property is owned jointly by both husband and dependent
wife.5 1
In this background an Air Force plane may crash into the quarters of a
military man, off duty, causing both personal injury and property damage.
His quarters may consist of a trailer (personal property) located at a duly
designated place on station, and thus constitute assigned quarters, or may
be a privately owned home in the United States, off-base, constituting un-
assigned quarters. As noted before, the Military Personnel Claims Act does
not provide for compensation for the loss of personal property at off-base
or unassigned quarters in the United States, and accordingly the Military
Personnel Claims Act cannot be the proper remedy in such cases and the
Tort Claims Act applies. Recovery for personal property lost in unassigned
quarters off-base as a result of the crash of an abandoned bomber was allowed
under the Tort Claims Act.5 2 Likewise, personal injuries sustained under
similar circumstances are not incident to service, and are therefore compen-
48. 10 U.S.C. § 2732 (1958).
49. AIR FORCE REG. 112-7; ARMY REG. 25-100; NAVY CLAIMS REG. 751.18, 1955
N.S., MCM.
50. Zoula v. United States, 217 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1954).
51. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, Ill F. Supp. 899 (N.D. Calif.
1953) ; Wallis v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 673 (E.D.N.C. 1954).
52. Snyder v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 585 (D.C. Md. 1953).
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sable under the Tort Claims Act, following the authority of the Brooks case.
Where a soldier is at his private quarters off-base, temporarily off-duty and
is injured by the negligence of others in the armed forces, he is held to have
a right of action under the Tort Claims Act.53 On the other hand, where
his trailer at an assigned location on-base is damaged by a crashing airplane
the damage has been held to be compensable under the Military Personnel
Claims Act. It involves damage to personal property, reasonable, useful and
necessary, incident to service, at assigned quarters. 54 Recovery under the
Tort Claims Act is thus precluded. In cases involving personal injuries in
which the Military Personnel Claims Act would be applicable for property
damage, recovery under the Tort Claims Act was held to be barred, and the
Feres case cited as authority.5
Where a serviceman is on leave, Il where he is returning from leave to
his base overseas but has not yet reported for duty, 7 and where he is tem-
porarily off duty at off-base quarters,58 he has been held eligible to bring
suit under the Tort Claims Act. On the other hand where the soldier has
been on post, though off duty and entitled to a pass, 59 where his personal
property at assigned on-base quarters is damaged, 60 and where his private
car, not used for official business, is parked at an official parking lot on the
base,61 he has been held to be barred from bringing suit under the Tort
Claims Act, the Military Personnel Claims Act providing the exclusive
remedy.
The distinguishing feature is whether damage or injury was incurred
incident to service. Where it was incurred incident to service, property
damage is compensable under the Military Personnel Claims Act and suit is
barred under the Tort Claims Act. Suit based on personal injury from the
same incident is also barred under the Tort Claims Act. On the other hand,
when the personal injury or property damage is incurred other than incident
to service, the Military Personnel Claims Act is inapplicable, and suit under
the Tort Claims Act is allowed. The reported cases, as noted above, indicate
53. Snyder v. United States, supra note 52; Sapp v. United States, 153 F. Supp.
496 (W.D. La. 1957).
54. Preferred Ins. Co. v. United States, 222 F.2d 942 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 837, rehearing denied, 351 U.S. 990 (1956).
55. Orken v. United States, 239 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1956).
56. Wuth v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Va. 1958).
57. Knecht v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 242 F.2d 929
(3d Cir. 1957).
58. Snyder v. United States, supra note 52; Sapp v. United States, supra note 53.
59. Zoula v. United States, supra note 50.
60. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, supra note 51.
61. United States v. United Services Automobile Ass'n, 238 F.2d 364 (8th Cir.
1956).
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that the problem of whether the damage or injury occurred incident to service
resolves itself into two questions:
(1) Was the serviceman in a duty status?
(2) Was he on the military reservation?
Apparently, if either of these questions is answered in the affirmative, the
loss or injury suffered will be held to have occurred incident to service.
Otherwise it will not. If incident to service, suit is barred under the Tort
Claims Act.
Civilian employees of the military services receive the same treatment
under the Military Personnel Claims Act as servicemen. Civil Service em-
ployees are also protected in event of death or injury by the Federal Em-
ployees Compensation Act.62 This act provides that the liability of the United
States thereunder with respect to the injury or death of any employee shall
be exclusive, and in place of all other liability.6 3 Accordingly, persons covered
by the act, including their survivors, have been precluded from bringing suit
under the Tort Claims Act.64 The construction placed upon this exclusionary
provision has been more devastating than that usually placed on Workman's
Compensation Statutes, which also provide that the compensation provided
for shall be the exclusive remedy. For example, a wife has been held com-
petent under such acts to bring an action in tort for loss of consortium, be-
cause this is a separate cause of action residing in the wife.6 5 However, where
the injured or deceased employee was covered by the Federal Employees
Compensation Act, the wife has been barred from bringing suit under the
Tort Claims Act.66
The theory of excluding claimants from recovery under the Tort Claims
Act, because an adequate remedy is elsewhere provided, has been extended
by a case decided in 1958 to exclude a civilian employee of an officers' club,
whose contract of employment included a compensation agreement through a
private insurance company. 7 It was held that this private compensation sys-
tem was the employee's exclusive remedy; however, it did not bar the wife
from bringing an action for loss of consortium. 5
Federal prisoners are also precluded from bringing suit under the Tort
Claims Act. Reasoning along the lines of the Feres case, it has been held
that Congress intended a uniform penal system and therefore provided for
62. 39 STAT. 743 (1916), 5 U.S.C. §§ 751-801 (1958).
63. Id. § 757.
64. Underwood v. United States, 207 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1953) ; see also Johansen
v. United States, 343 U.S. 427 (1952).
65. Hitaffer v. Argonne, 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
66. Underwood v. United States, supra note 64.




compensation of prisoners in those situations which it deemed necessary
from the Prison Industries Fund. 69 It is unreasonable to believe, said the
court, that Congress intended to open the federal courts to every prisoner
who wished to assert a claim under the law of the place where the act
occurred.
70
We have considered the restriction placed upon military personnel, civil
service employees, and federal prisoners with respect to bringing an action
under the Tort Claims Act. For restrictions involving other individuals,
especially in the area of aircraft accidents, we must examine the effect given
to a release. It is a common practice by the military services to obtain varying
types of releases from prospective passengers and others in connection with
the operation of aircraft. A release given by a civilian passenger prior to
making a flight on an Air Force plane is actually a covenant not to sue rather
than a release, since the passenger has no claim to release at the time he
executes the writing. However, this is a technical distinction. Such an
instrument will not bar recovery for wilful, wanton, or gross negligence,
for this would be violative of public policy. Such a release is a bar to recovery
for simple negligence, however. 71 Where an exculpatory agreement was
entered into between a private corporation and the Air Force concerning the
use by the corporation of Air Force landing facilities at Elmendorf Air Base,
Alaska, the court held the agreement exculpating the United States from
liability invalid.7 2 The court cited the Restatement of Contracts sec. 575(1)
to the effect that: (1) A bargain for exemption from liability for a wilful
breach of duty is illegal; (2) A bargain for exemption from liability for the
consequences of negligence is illegal if one of the parties is charged with a
duty of public service, and the bargain relates to negligence in the performance
of any part of its duty to the public for which it has received compensation.
Since the exemption from liability pursuant to the agreement related to the
performance of a part of the duty of the parties to the public, for which the
public paid compensation, the agreement was held illegal. Thus it would ap-
pear that a release to the government is also invalid to the extent that it
attempts to relieve the government from liability for simple negligence in
connection with service for which the public has paid compensation.
Closely allied to the covenant not to sue is a genuine release given after
a claim has arisen. The Tort Claims Act itself provides that the acceptance of
any award, compromise, or settlement under the act shall constitute a com-
plete release of any claim against the United States and against the employee
69. 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1958).
70. Sigman v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Va. 1953).
71. Friedman v. Lockheed, 138 F. Supp. 530 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).
72. Air Transport Associates v. United States, 221 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1955).
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of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.73 It further
provides that recovery of a judgment shall constitute a complete bar to an
action by the claimant against the employee of the government. 74 Notwith-
standing these provisions the same reasoning does not apply in reverse. When
the claimant has given a release to the government employee, the question of
whether such release also releases the United States will be determined in
accordance with local law. Where a release was given to a government em-
ployee in Idaho, it was held under Idaho law that a release to one joint
tortfeasor only releases the other when by its terms it purports to indemnify
the plaintiff completely. Since the release in question did not purport to do
that, it did not release the United States.75
Closely allied with the problem created by releases is that of the claimant
who has submitted an administrative claim, and after the administrative claim
is denied, desires to sue for a larger amount. In many instances a claimant
may submit his claim initially in an amount less than 1,000 dollars (increased
to 2,500 dollars by P.L. 238, 86th Congress) so as to meet the statutory
limitation for an administrative settlement. The act provides, however, that
an action may not be instituted for any sum in excess of the amount of the
claim presented, unless based upon newly discovered evidence. 76 This provi-
sion has been strictly construed and the amount of a reduced claim presented
administratively has been held to be the limit of recovery under the Tort
Claims Act,77 and a claim originally presented administratively for 1,000
dollars could not be increased, when the suit was filed, to 2,000 dollars.78 Al-
though suit will not be dismissed because the amount alleged is in excess of
the claim presented administratively, the recovery allowed will be limited to
the amount of the administrative claim.
79
Although the foregoing rule has worked to the detriment of plaintiffs who
have previously submitted an administrative claim, it has been held that
execution of a Settlement Agreement, Form 96 did not constitute the presenta-
tion of a claim, but was merely an offer of compromise, and accordingly suit
was allowed in the amount of 3,500 dollars.80
The next question that must be considered is the effect of the location of
the accident, for such accidents may occur in the United States, on or over
the high seas, or in a foreign country. No problem is presented when the
73. Federal Tort Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2672 (1958).
74. Id. § 2676.
75. Friday v. United States, 239 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1957).
76. Federal Tort Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2675 (1958).
77. Corkle v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 908 (E.D.S.C. 1951).
78. Carson v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 337 (N.D. II. 1949).
79. Reardon v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 35 (D.C. Mass. 1949) ; see also Morgan
v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
80. Barroll v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 441 (D.C. Md. 1955).
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crash occurs in the United States. However, the act specifically provides
that any claim arising in a foreign country is excepted from its operation.81
In considering the effect of this provision, cognizance must be taken of
the Foreign Claims Act which, in the interest of maintaining good will
throughout the world, provides for the settlement of claims up to a maximum
limitation of 15,000 dollars.8 2 Claims under this act may be filed for damages
to real or personal property, personal injury or death, arising out of the
non-combatant activities of the armed forces. Negligence by the United
States is not a necessary basis for recovery, although the local law of con-
tributory negligence may be applied to deny recovery. The claim must be
presented by an inhabitant of a foreign country, and the amount tendered
must be accepted in full satisfaction, releasing the government and its em-
ployee. It is noteworthy that although the Foreign Claims Act excludes claims
arising from combatant activities, it does not necessarily exclude all claims
arising during wartime. This is an important distinction, since many non-
combatant flights may take place during time of war. The act expressly
recognizes this distinction by tolling the applicable statute of limitations
during wartime periods.
Defining the term "foreign country" as used in the Tort Claims Act, the
Supreme Court said, "We know of no more accurate phrase in common
English usage than 'foreign country' to denote territory subject to the sover-
eignty of another nation. 8 3 By the exclusion of claims arising in a foreign
country the coverage of the Tort Claims Act was geared to the sovereignty
of the United States. The Court further found that the arrangements under
which leased areas (a Newfoundland air base) were acquired from Great
Britain did not, and were not intended to transfer sovereignty over the leased
areas from Great Britain to the United States. Therefore, the Tort Claims
Act was inapplicable.8 4 The Island of Kwajalein, even though governed by
the United States as a trustee under authority of the United Nations, has been
held to be a foreign country not subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States. 15 The Island of Okinawa, even though occupied by United States
forces, is a foreign country not subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.86 On the other hand, in a case arising on the Island of Guam, no
question was raised concerning the applicability of the Tort Claims Act, nor
was it contended that Guam is a foreign country. As a possession of the
81. Federal Tort Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1958).
82. 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1958).
83. United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 219 (1949).
84. United States v. Spelar, supra note 83.
85. Callas v. United States, 253 F.2d 838 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 936
(1958).
86. Buma v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 623 (D.C. Va.), aff'd, 240 F.2d 720 (4th
Cir. 1957).
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United States, Guam is subject to the sovereignty of the United States, and
the Tort Claims Act is applicable there.
8 7
Recognizing these decisions under the Tort Claims Act, Congress in the
Foreign Claims Act has specifically provided that "In this section 'foreign





A foreign national injured in his native country is excluded from re-
covery under the Tort Claims Act, but may recover under the Foreign Claims
Act. Conversely, when his damage or injury is suffered on the high seas, or
in the United States, the Tort Claims Act applies. There is one situation,
however, when recovery is precluded by both acts. This occurs when a
person is injured in a country foreign to the United States, but of which he
is not an inhabitant. This vacuum is filled to some extent by the provisions
of the Status of Forces Agreements, which permit the filing of suit in a
host nation and the consideration of claims arising from non-combatant activi-
ties by the host nation in the same manner as its own claims are considered.
8 9
This constitutes one measure of relief to persons otherwise excluded under the
Foreign Claims Act and also provides an alternative remedy to persons falling
within its terms. Furthermore, military personnel as previously discussed are
ordinarily precluded from bringing suit for active duty injuries, being pro-
tected by the benefits applicable to servicemen, while civilian personnel in
foreign countries are in large measure covered by the Federal Employees
Compensation Act. Both groups are also protected against personal property
loss by the Military Personnel Claims Act. The only group that remains
largely unprovided for is the American citizen abroad who is not connected
with the military establishment, nor an employee of the government. This
category is comprised largely of tourists, who at present have no remedy for
loss suffered as a result of an overseas airplane crash other than to bring suit
in a foreign court, which in many cases would seem to be a difficult obstacle
to overcome.
The Tort Claims Act, in addition to excepting those claims arising in a
foreign country, also excepts those claims within the purview of the Suits in
Admiralty Act9° and those within the purview of the Public Vessels Act.91
By their terms, both the Public Vessels Act and the Suits in Admiralty Act
pertain to vessels, and no case within the knowledge of the writer has yet
87. Oaken v. United States, supra note 55.
88. Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1958).
89. North Atlantic Treaty, Status of Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. & O.I.A.
1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846.
90. Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1958).
91. Public Vessels Act, 43 STAT. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 (1958). See
Federal Tort Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2680(d) (1958).
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defined an airplane as a vessel. Consequently, with respect to liability for
the operation of aircraft, these provisions are immaterial.
Other than these exceptions, and the exception pertaining to those claims
arising in a foreign country, the Tort Claims Act is geared to the sovereignty
of the United States. Since the sovereignty of the United States extends to
all things maritime, the Tort Claims Act applies to maritime torts, except in-
sofar as excluded by the foregoing. 92 Where death, injury, or damage occurs
as the result of an aircraft accident over the high seas, recovery may be had
under the Tort Claims Act.
Illustrative of situations which might arise is that in which a bomb was
accidentally dropped from a military aircraft over navigable waters. The
bomb became entangled in a fishing net and exploded killing a fisherman and
damaging the fishing boat. It was held in this case that the Suits in Admiralty
Act and the Public Vessels Act were inapplicable, hence suit under the Tort
Claims Act was proper. The court emphasized the distinction between torts
of employees under the Tort Claims Act, and those cognizable under the
Public Vessels and Suits in Admiralty Acts.
93
The Lex Loci Delictus is incorporated in the Tort Claims Act to deter-
mine with respect to situations not specifically covered:
(a) What acts or omissions are negligent or wrongful, hence actionable;
(b) Who is entitled to maintain the action; and
(c) What is the measure and extent of recovery.
9 4
Where the tort occurred on the high seas, maritime or admiralty law is the
lex locus delicti.9 5 At common law there was no right of recovery for death
on the high seas; hence, the substantive law allowing for recovery for death
on the high seas is the Death on the High Seas Act.96 In the absence of
this statute, there would be no right of action, and no suit could be brought
for a death occurring on the high seas. The substantive right of action having
been created generally, the United States has waived its immunity from suit
in such situations by the Tort Claims Act.97 Actions under the Death on the
High Seas Act must, however, be brought in Admiralty.9 8 Although Rule 1
(and 81) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except admiralty proceed-
ings, this does not mean that such proceedings are not civil actions. This
provision is merely designed to take admiralty proceedings out of that single
form of action contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.99
92. Moran v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 275 (D.C. Conn. 1951).
93. Ibid.
94. Kunkel v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 591 (S.D. Calif. 1956).
95. Kunkel v. United States, supra note 94; Moran v. United States, supra note 92.
96. Death on the High Seas Act, 41 STAT. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-767 (1958).
97. Kunkel v. United States, supra note 94.
98. Higa v. Transocean Airlines, 230 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1955).
99. Moran v. United States, supra note 92.
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Accordingly, in such cases where a death on the high seas is involved, suit
is brought in the District Court, in Admiralty, based upon the substantive
law of the Death on the High Seas Act, and the waiver of immunity by the
United States is found in the Tort Claims Act.100
In arriving at the foregoing construction, the courts have indulged in
the reasoning that admiralty jurisdiction is determined according to the place
where the impact of the tort occurred, not where the tortious act was com-
mitted. Although the tortious act was committed in the air, the impact of
the tort, namely death, occurred on the water where the plane crashed, either
as a direct result of the impact or from subsequent drowning. Such.cases are
within the scope of admiralty jurisdiction.1 1 Although this line of reasoning
has been unanimously adopted by the courts confronted with the problem to
date, an interesting problem is raised when the ruling in the Eastern Airlines
case is considered. 10 2 In that case it was held that the tort was committed
in a control tower located in Virginia, while the deaths occurred at National
Airport in the District of Columbia. The court there applied the Virginia
law pertaining to wrongful death actions to limit recovery for the deaths in-
volved, on the theory that the law of the place where the tortious act occurred
was controlling. If this rule were applied to the cases over the high seas,
admiralty law would become inapplicable, and there would be no right of
recovery for tortious acts occurring in the air and resulting in death. This,
of course, would be an untenable result.
The basis of liability under the Tort Claims Act is negligent or wrongful
conduct by employees of the government, acting within the scope of their
employment. Clearly then, the Act does not extend to cases of absolute lia-
bility, and this has been the holding of the cases.'
0 3
Although this rule appears fairly simple, the Tort Claims Act also
provides that the United States shall be liable as a private person. Where
under state law, the only recovery for a tortious act is on a theory of absolute
liability, we find ourselves on the horns of a dilemma. To be liable at all, the
United States must be liable as a private person; but at times a private person
can only be liable on a theory of absolute liability, while the United States
cannot be held absolutely liable under the Tort Claims Act.
This problem is of particular importance in cases involving government
aircraft. As previously indicated, the common law rule in connection with
100. Kunkel v. United States, supra note 94; Higa v. Transocean Airlines, supra
note 98; Moran v. United States, supra note 92; Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121
F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Calif. 1954).
101. Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, supra note 100.
102. Eastern Airlines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (C.A.D.C.), aff'd against
the United States, 350 U.S. 907 (1955).
103. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953) ; United States v. Ure, 225
F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1955) ; United States v. Hull, 195 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1952).
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the operation of aircraft was one of absolute liability. Consistent with the
common law rule, many states have adopted the Uniform Aeronautics Act,
which provides in substance that the owner of every aircraft which is operated
over land or water is absolutely liable for injuries to persons or property
beneath caused by the ascent, descent, or flight of the aircraft, or by the
dropping or falling of any object therefrom.
10 4
Obviously, where there is negligence in the operation of government air-
craft, recovery under the Tort Claims Act would seem appropriate. Congress
intended to diminish private legislation. It is impossible to define all tort
law, and it is unthinkable that Congress intended that the United States
should be liable for such aircraft accidents in states having negligence as a
basis for such liability, while not being liable in states adopting the Uniform
Aeronautics Act. One court asserted that the Uniform Aeronautics Act
renders the act or omission causing the injury a wrongful act, a basis for
liability under the Tort Claims Act.10 5 Another case held that the state
statute imposing absolute liability upon the owner of an aircraft was not ap-
plicable to the United States, and disregarding the statute, applied the state
law of negligence and respondeat superior.10 6 The mere fact that state law
imposes absolute liability in connection with certain dangerous activities
should not relieve the government of liability where such activities were
negligently conducted by employees and agents of the government. There is
no requirement under the Tort Claims Act that the government and the pri-
vate individual be liable on identical theories. If through negligence, injury
or damage has been caused by the employees of the United States, and if
under the same set of facts a private individual would be held liable under
state law, albeit, based upon a theory of liability without fault, the govern-
ment can be held liable to the same extent as a private person. 0 7 The gov-
ernment in such case is held liable because of the negligent act of its employee.
Such liability, in amount, is limited to that which would be imposed upon a
private person under state law, even though imposed on the basis of absolute
liability rather than negligence. In any case, where recovery is allowed for
injury inflicted, regardless of the fault of the defendant, it would seem that
a showing of negligence could only strengthen the plaintiff's case.
Proper evaluation of the Tort Claims Act as a part of the complete
system of remedies enacted by Congress requires consideration of the Military
Claims Act.10 8 Under this act, administrative settlement of claims up to
5,000 dollars may be effected, if such claim is for damage to personal property,
104. United States v. Praylou, 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1952).
105. Ibid.
106. United States v. Taylor, supra note 30.
107. Bulloch v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 885 (D.C. Utah, 1955).
108. Military Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2733 (1958).
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real property, personal injury or death, caused by a civilian employee or mem-
ber of the Armed Forces in the scope of their employment, or otherwise
incident to non-combatant activities. Excepted from the act are those claims
which may be settled under the Foreign Claims Act, the Military Personnel
Claims Act, or the Tort Claims Act. The claimant must also be free from
contributory negligence.
The resulting scheme of recovery is that those persons who are in the
military service recover under the Military Personnel Claims Act and other
military benefit acts; civil service personnel recover under the Federal Em-
ployees Compensation Act for personal injury and death, and for property
damage recover under the Military Personnel Claims Act if serving with the
military. Other persons in general recover for property damage, personal
injury and death under the Military Claims Act if there is no negligence, and
under the Tort Claims Act if there is negligence. Foreign claimants, in-
habitants of the country wherein the tort occurred, recover under the Foreign
Claims Act.
Thus in practically all of the myriad of fact situations which may be
involved where there has been injury or loss inflicted through the operation
of government aircraft, some form of remedy is available. Likewise, some of
the reasons will also apply to other instrumentalities by which injury may be
inflicted by employees of the government. It is hoped that the foregoing dis-
cussion will help the reader in unscrambling the many statutory provisions
and the countless decisions which affect the right of a claimant to obtain a
just recovery for injury or loss resulting from the operation of government
aircraft. It must be remembered that the keystone in this scheme of relief is
the Tort Claims Act, which cannot be isolated, nor its provisions be con-
sidered out of context without reference to the many other remedies that may
be available to the same claimant. It is only when placed in its proper per-
spective in relation to the other acts providing for relief that the Tort Claims
Act, with its many exceptions, provisos, and shades of interpretation, may be
understood.
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